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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This appeal follows Appellant Daniel Widner' s conditional guilty plea to one count of

trafficking in marijuana, LC. § 37-2732B(a)(l)(A) and (D) and one misdemeanor count of
concealing a dangerous weapon while in a motor vehicle, LC. § 18-3302(2) and ( 14). R 188-191;
196-199. Mr. Widner should be granted relief on appeal because the district court erred in
denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence obtained as the result of an unconstitutional
stop.
B.

Course of Proceedings in the District Court
On March 29, 2011, the state filed an information in Elmore County charging Mr. Widner

with trafficking in marijuana and concealing a dangerous weapon within a motor vehicle. R 3536. Mr. Widner was arraigned on April 18, 2011. R 37-38.
The court entered a scheduling order setting the case for a pretrial conference on July 8,
2011, and a jury trial on August 3, 2011. R 39-40.
On June 7, 2011, defense counsel filed a motion in limine pursuant to IRE 104(a) and
ICR 12(b) to exclude all evidence obtained incident to Mr. Widner's arrest. R 43-44.
While the state filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion in limine on the basis
that the evidence in question was constitutionally obtained, R 130-149, the state never objected
to the denomination of the motion as a motion in limine as opposed to a motion to suppress
evidence and the state never objected to the motion as being untimely. ROA.
When the motion came up for hearing, the district court specifically addressed counsel
about the denomination of the motion:

1

The Court: All right. My question, I guess, just to clarify my thinking is, why are
you calling this a motion in limine instead of a motion to suppress under Rule 12
of the criminal rules?
Defense Counsel: Well, we just called it a motion in limine, Your Honor, just
because that fits within the general category of any motion pretrial.
The Court: All right.
Prosecutor: You Honor, the state would waive any opening and reserve for
closing.
Tr. 9/13/11, p. 4, ln. 23 - p. 5, ln. 7.
Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion in limine. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 158,
ln. 4 - p. 168, ln. 12; R 175-176.
Thereafter, Mr. Widner entered a conditional guilty plea to both charges. Tr. 12/19/11.
The nature of the plea is demonstrated by the following exchange between court and counsel:
The Court: All right. Is this a conditional plea?
Defense Counsel: Yes, it is Your Honor.
Tr. 12/19/11, p. 9, ln. 12-14.
The state did not object to this description of the plea. Tr. 12119/11, p. 9, ln. 15-25.
When reminded by the court that a conditional plea should be documented in writing,
defense counsel apologized for being unaware of the requirement. The court then took a recess
to allow counsel to write out the agreement. Tr. 12/19/11, p. 10, ln. 14 - p. 12, In. 13.
Thereafter, proceedings resumed and the district court stated that it understood that the
plea preserved the right to appeal the court's prior decision on the motion in limine and clarified
with Mr. Widner that this conformed to his understanding. Tr. 12/19/11, p. 20, In. 20 - p. 21, ln.
1. A few minutes later, the court stated:
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And, for the record, I would say I approve - in accordance with the Rule - I would
approve the right to enter the conditional plea, reserving your right the right to
appeal.
Tr. 12/19/11, p. 23, In. 7-10.
Again, the state did not object to the description of the plea as conditional upon the right
to appeal the motion in limine. Tr. 12/19/11, p. 23, In. 10-25.
At the close of the plea hearing, in accepting the plea, the court stated, "This is a
conditional plea. We've already covered that." Tr. 12/19/11, p. 35, In. 17-18. Again, the state
did not object. Tr. 12/19/11, p. 35, In. 19-25.
The ROA does not reflect that written documentation of the plea agreement was ever
filed. ROA.
However, at sentencing, defense counsel again referred to the conditional nature of the
plea, Tr. 3/21/12, p. 82, In. 8-10; p. 93, In. 17-18, and the state again did not object. Tr. 3/21/12,
p. 82, In. 11 - p. 96, In. 19.
The district court imposed a sentence of one year fixed plus 14 indeterminate on the
trafficking charge and 180 days concurrent on the misdemeanor. Tr. 3/21/12, p. 99, In. 13 - p.
100, In. 20.
This appeal follows. R 196-99, 235. 1
C.

Facts Relevant to Appeal

At the preliminary hearing, Mountain Home Police Officer Ryan Malenese testified that
he conducted a traffic stop of a Honda driven by Mr. Widner about 11 :22 p.m. on January 30,
1

Mr. Stewart, the owner and passenger of the car unconstitutionally stopped, joined in
the motion in limine. His appeal is currently pending before this Court in State v. Stewart, No.
39887, Elmore County No. CR-2011-493.
3

2011. Tr. 2/25/11, p. 4, In. 11 - p. 8, In. 18. He testified that he noticed the Honda because it
was going 28 miles per hour on a street which comes into town from the direction of the
interstate. The street's speed limit begins at 45 miles per hour, decreases to 35 and then
decreases again to 25. The Honda was near the place where the speed transitions from 45 to 35
miles per hour. Tr. 2/25/11, p. 5, In. 1-25.
Officer Malenese followed the car and ultimately initiated a stop because Mr. Widner did
not signal when the roadway increased from a one-lane to a two-lane road and because he did not
later signal when he continued on the roadway as it went through what Officer Malenese called a
T-intersection. Tr. 2/25/11, p. 8, In. 2-18.
Mr. Widner filed his motion in limine to exclude the evidence obtained following this
traffic stop on the basis that the stop was not valid because he had broken no traffic laws in either
going 28 miles per hour or in not signaling at either place noted by the officer. R 45-89.
The district court reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript and evidence presented at a
hearing on the motion and held that there was no basis to conduct a traffic stop because there was
no duty to signal either where the lanes expanded from one to two or where the roadway turned
to the right. Tr. 10/11111 p. 112, In. 21 - p. 120, In. 22; Tr. 10/27/11 p. 6, In. 24 - p. 10, In. 7.
The state then presented evidence to provide a different basis for stopping the Honda.
Detective Jessup of the Mountain Home Police Department testified that a confidential
informant (CI) working off a charge of delivery of marijuana had identified Mr. Widner as a
"target." Tr.10/27/11,p.17,ln.16-p.18,ln.15. DetectiveJessuptestifiedthathehadfour
"operations" with the CI and that in those "operations" he was able to verify the information
from the CI "both by taking the information given, just attempting to cooperate through other
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informants' sources and surveillance." Tr. 10/27/11, p. 18, In. 20 - p. 19, In. 10.
Detective Jessup testified that the CI made two controlled purchases from Mr. Widner.
Tr. 10/27/11, p. 19, In. 16-18. The dates of the buys were October 19, 2010, and December 14,
2010. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 33, In. 3-4. However, neither of these purchases resulted in any arrest or
prosecution. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 38, In. 3-5.
Detective Jessup testified that the CI advised him on January 11, 2011, "that he or she
believed that Mr. Widner was going to be traveling to California either on that weekend or the
following weekend to resupply marijuana." Tr. 10/27/11, p. 21, In. 18 - p. 22, In. 4. Detective
Jessup asked the CI to confirm the information and contact him. However, apparently nothing
happened. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 22, In. 7-11. Detective Jessup offered no testimony about the Cl's
basis of knowledge. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 22.
Then on January 21, 2011, Detective Jessup initiated contact with the CI who told him
that he or she had not had any contact with Mr. Widner and believed that Mr. Widner was
probably out of marijuana. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 22, In. 21-24. Again, Detective Jessup offered no
testimony regarding the Cl's basis of knowledge of anything other than his or her own lack of
contact with Mr. Widner. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 22.
According to Detective Jessup, later that day, the CI contacted him again to say that Mr.
Widner was in town but that he was going to be traveling to California. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 23, In.
7-10. Again, Detective Jessup offered no testimony regarding the Cl's basis of knowledge. Tr.
10/27/11, p. 23.
Detective Jessup testified that he contacted the CI again on January 26. At that time, the
CI said he or she had not talked to Mr. Widner for a couple of days. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 23, In. 16 5

p. 24, In. 6. According to Detective Jessup, "The informant eventually told me that he or she had
learned that Mr. Widner was going to be traveling to California on that weekend." Tr. 10/27/11,
p. 24, In. 13-15. Again, Detective Jessup offered no testimony as to the basis of the Cl's
knowledge of anything except his or her own lack of contact with Mr. Widner. Tr. 10/27111, p.
24.
Detective Jessup testified that on January 29, he again initiated contact with the CI who
told him that he or she had not spoken with Mr. Widner for a couple of days and believed that
Mr. Widner had left Mountain Home. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 24, In. 17 - p. 25, In. 4. Again, Detective
Jessup offered no testimony as to the basis of the Cl's knowledge as to whether Mr. Widner was
in Mountain Home or not. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 25.
Detective Jessup testified that based upon the Cl's information he conducted surveillance
on Mr. Widner's house to see if his car was missing. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 25, In. 7-10. In a later
contact that day, the CI said that he or she had learned that Mr. Widner was planning to leave in
the early morning hours of January 30. Tr. p. 10/27/11, p. 25, In. 16-19. Detective Jessup said
that the CI told him that Mr. Widner would return either the night of January 30 or the morning
of January 31. Tr. p. 10/27/11, p. 25, In. 20-23. Again, the detective did not testify to the Cl's
basis of knowledge. Tr. p. 10/27111, p. 25.
On January 30, Detective Jessup went to Mr. Widner's house and saw that both his cars
were there and stayed there throughout the day. So, he contacted the CI again. Tr. 10/27/11, p.
26, In. 1-15. Detective Jessup testified that the CI had no further information as to whether Mr.
Widner had left or what vehicle he was in. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 26, In. 20 - p. 27, In. 2.
Then, according to the detective, at about 6:00 p.m., the CI contacted him. Detective
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Jessup testified, "I was told that by the informant that the information he or she learned was that
Mr. Widner had traveled to California with a roommate, Alex Stewart, and they were said to be
in Mr. Stewart's vehicle." Tr. 10/27/11, p. 27, In. 7 - p. 28, In. 11. Again, the detective did not
testify as to the Cl's basis of knowledge. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 27.
The detective knew that Mr. Stewart drove a 1988 Honda Civic with Elmore County
plates. He had seen the car in the past at Mr. Widner's residence and at Mr. Stewart's place of
employment. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 28, In. 12 - p. 29, In. 2. He drove by Mr. Widner's residence and
Mr. Stewart's place of employment on the 30th and did not see Mr. Stewart's car. Tr. 10/27/11,
p. 29, In. 3-20; p. 30, In. 20 - p. 31, In. 10.
In sum, the CI had told Detective Jessup that Mr. Widner was going to California on the
14th or 21st of January, but the predictions did not come true as far as Detective Jessup was aware.
Tr. 10/27/11, p. 39, In. 7 - p. 41, In. 2. Then the CI said that he or she "had learned," without
specification of how or from whom, that Mr. Widner had gone to California with Mr. Stewart
and "that they were said," again without specification of by whom, or this person's basis of
knowledge, to be traveling in Mr. Stewart's car. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 28, In. 7-11.
Detective Jessup testified that he drove past Mr. Widner's house and Mr. Stewart's place
of employment, but did not see Mr. Stewart's car at either place. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 28, In. 22 - p.
31, In. 21.
Based upon this information, Detective Jessup and Sergeant Griggs "just came up with a
plan to meet later ... in an attempt to intercept the vehicle as it came back to Mountain Home."
Tr. 10/27111, p. 29, In. 23 - p. 30, ln. 5. Detective Jessup told a patrol supervisor about the plan,
but the information did not go out by radio. Tr. 10/27111, p. 56, In. 2-25. No one made any
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effort whatsoever to obtain a warrant either to arrest Mr. Widner or to search Mr. Stewart's car.
Tr. 10/27/11, p. 259, In. 18 - p. 60, In. 7.
Officer Malenese testified that he was advised by a sergeant to be on the lookout for a car
bearing a certain license number. He testified:
I was given the license plate number and told that ifI saw the vehicle and could
develop my own probable cause for stopping the vehicle, to do so, and that the
vehicle had a large amount of marijuana in it.
Tr. 10/27/11, p. 71, In. 17-22.
Officer Malenese testified that after being given the plate number, he ran it to determine
what sort of car to watch for. From that he understood that he was to be looking for a Honda
Accord. Tr. 10/27111, p. 76, In. 19-23. However, the car he actually stopped was a 1988 Honda
Civic. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 78, In. 10-11. Later, he testified that he did not actually have a specific
recall of the model as opposed to the make of the car that came back when he ran the license
plate number. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 80, In. 20-23.
When Officer Malenese stopped Mr. Widner, Detective Jessup heard about the stop on
the radio and responded immediately to the scene. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 58, ln. 1-18.
Defense counsel argued that the evidence obtained as a result of the stop should be
suppressed because there was no testimony given as to the basis of the Cl's information
including even where the CI was getting the information. Defense counsel also argued that what
little information was generated about the Cl's history of giving information revealed that the CI
was often simply wrong. And, lastly, on January 30, 2011, the Cl's information was only that
Mr. Widner was said by some unknown person to be traveling to California in Mr. Stewart's car.
Tr. 10/27/11, p. 85, In. 2 - p. 92, In. 25. As argued by counsel:
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The last call there's no further information in here about whether they're going to
California, who they're going to be getting marijuana from, when they're exactly
leaving, when they're coming back, what exactly are they driving, how much are
they bringing back, what is it going to be packaged in.
Tr. 10/27/11, p. 90, In. 2-8.
Counsel concluded:
... they did not have a valid reason to stop either for the [traffic] violation or for
the tip from the confidential informant. The tip was not nearly reliable enough,
speaking of which, when Detective - or excuse me, Officer Malenese attempted to
independently corroborate the information he had been given, the license plate
number for the pass-along meeting, he runs that through his system, and he
testified it came back Honda Accord, and then he pulled over a Honda Civic.
That indicates that none of these officers had sufficient information, sufficiently
reliable information, from this confidential informant to make a valid stop or to
get a warrant, either one. There was not sufficient here, Your Honor, based on
any of the prongs that are in State v. Bishop[, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P.3d 1203
(2009)]. We would argue that, therefore, because of that, anything seized as a
result of the stop must be suppressed.
Tr. 10/27/11, p. 93, In. 25 -p. 94, In. 19.
However, the district court denied the defense motion stating:
And so my ruling is, while the officers did not have a basis to stop the car on the
signal, the officers did have a reasonable basis, suspicion, based upon the totality
of all of the circumstances from October 21 up to and including the night of
January 30, all of the dealings between the CI and the officers, culminating in
these two defendants have left town to get the marijuana, they're in this car, the
officer knew the car, Jessup, the detective, knew the license number and that was
told.
Tr. 10/27/11, p. 97, In. 16 - p. 98, In. 1.
Thereafter, Officer Malenese testified that when he stopped the car, he told Mr. Widner
that the stop was for failure to signal. He testified that his purpose for the stop was not
marijuana. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 108, In. 1-16.
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Officer Malenese testified that when he approached the car, he could smell marijuana.
Tr. 10/27111, p. 123, ln. 20 - p. 124, ln. 4. Eventually the car was searched and marijuana was
found. PH Tr. p. 62, ln. 22-16; PH Tr. p. 88, ln. 5-10.

III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Can a tip from a confidential informant which passes along hearsay information given to
the informant by an unidentified person or persons whose information has proven incorrect in the
past and whose basis of knowledge, reliability and veracity are completely unknown, provide
reasonable and articulable suspicion to support an investigatory stop?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

This Court May Consider the Challenge to the Erroneous Denial of the Motion in
Limine on Appeal

1.

The State is Estopped from Arguing that Mr. Widner does not have the
Right to Appeal

Due to the absence of a written reservation of appellate rights, the state may attempt to
argue that there is not an adequate conditional plea of guilty under ICR 11 (a)(2) and that Mr.
Widner does not have the right to appeal. However, the state is judicially estopped from taking a
position directly opposite to the position it took in the district court.
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one
position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position.
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492, 502 (2004). The Idaho
Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v. Church, 76
Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954).
A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). As explained by the

Court of Appeals, there are very important reasons behind the doctrine of judicial estoppel:
One purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial system, by
10

protecting the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity
of judicial proceedings. The doctrine is also intended to prevent parties from
playing fast and loose with the courts.

Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131Idaho99, 101, 952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct. App. 1998)
(internal citations omitted) cited with favor in A & J Const., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho at 685, 116
P.3d at 15.
Here, the state obtained a guilty plea from Mr. Widner conditioned on its concession that
he could appeal from the denial of his pretrial motion. The state agreed the plea was conditional
repeatedly, both at the guilty plea hearing and again at sentencing. Tr. 12/19/11, p. 9, In. 12-25;
Tr. 12/19/11, p. 23, ln. 7-25; Tr. 12/19/11, p. 35, ln. 17-25; Tr. 3/21/12, p. 82, In. 11 - p. 96, ln.
19. Thus, the state is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel from arguing before this Court
that the plea was not conditional and that Mr. Widner cannot now appeal.
2.

The State is Estopped from Arguing that Mr. Widner 's Motion was an
Untimely ICR 12(b)(3) Motion to Suppress

The state may also attempt to argue that appellate relief should be denied because Mr.
Widner's pretrial motion was not a motion in limine but rather an untimely ICR 12(b)(3) motion
to suppress evidence. However, the state is judicially estopped from taking a position opposite
the position it took in the district court. A & J Const., inc. v. Wood, supra; Robertson Supply,

Inc. v. Nicholls, supra.
The district court specifically questioned the denomination of the motion in limine asking
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why it was a motion in limine2 rather than a motion to suppress under ICR 12(b). Tr. 9/13/11, p.
4, ln. 23 - p. 5, ln. 7. Defense counsel stated that it was a motion in limine and the state did not
object. Id. In fact, the state itselfreferred to the motion as a motion in limine. R 130-149
(Memorandum in Opposition to Motion in Limine). And, as a motion in limine, the motion was
timely as the district court had not set a cutoff date for such motions. R 39-40.
The state achieved an advantage in having the motion treated as a motion in limine
insofar as it insulated itself from a later post-conviction claim that defense counsel was
ineffective in failing to file a timely suppression motion. Because the state took the position that
the motion was a motion in limine, it is now judicially estopped from arguing that the motion
was actually an ICR 12(b)(3) motion to suppress evidence and that the district court erred in
hearing the motion in the absence of a district court finding of good cause or excusable neglect
per ICR 12(d). See State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 597, 887 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Ct. App. 1994);
State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 591, 944 P.2d 721, 726 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Cochran, 129

Idaho 944, 947, 935 P.2d 207, 210 (Ct. App. 1997), requiring a finding of good cause or
excusable neglect. But see, State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 575-76, 225 P.2d 1169, 1170-71

2

According to Professor Lewis:

A motion in limine is a request for a ruling on the admissibility of evidence, made
in advance of the offer of the evidence and outside the presence of the jury.
The motion in limine is not mentioned in the civil or criminal rules of procedure.
It is nonetheless a recognized means for obtaining an advance ruling on the
admissibility of evidence ... It also provides an opportunity for briefing,

argument, and reasoned consideration by the court on complex evidentiary
questions.
D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook§ 3:2 (2d ed.).
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(2010), addressing on the merits a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion made nearly
four months after entry of a not guilty plea without any apparent finding of good cause or
excusable neglect.
Because the state did not move to dismiss the motion as an untimely motion to suppress,
because it did not object to, but rather embraced the denomination of the motion as a motion in
limine, and because by doing so it protected itself from a later post-conviction claim, the state is
now judicially estopped from arguing in this appeal that the motion was an untimely motion to
suppress. A & J Const., Inc. v. Wood, supra; Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, supra.
B.

The Motion In Limine Should Have Been Granted Because the Police Lacked a
Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion to Support the Stop of the Honda

1.

Standard ofReview

The standard of review of a suppression motion should be applied to this motion in
limine as both concern the same issue - whether the evidence against Mr. Widner should be
excluded from trial because it was obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17.
The standard of review applied to suppression motions is as follows:
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on
a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact
which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application
of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 138 Idaho 559,
561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Crooks, 150 Idaho 117, 119, 244 P.3d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 2010).
2.

Argument

An investigatory stop may only be made if the police have a reasonable and articulable
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suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. While reasonable and
articulable suspicion may be grounded in information received from an informant including
hearsay known to the informant and related to the police, in this case where the informant's
hearsay information had a history of being wrong and the state could not demonstrate either the
identity of the hearsay declarant or declarants, or the basis of knowledge, reliability, or veracity
of the declarant or declarants, the tip was insufficient to support the stop.
The applicable law is set out in State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P.3d 1203 (2009):
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects '[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.' U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. This guarantee
has been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to apply to the states. See, e.g. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81
S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1089 (1961). Evidence obtained in violation of
the amendment generally may not be used be used as evidence against the victim
of the illegal government action. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d
454, 459 (2004); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct.
407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 453 (1963). This rule, know as the exclusionary rule,
applies to evidence obtained directly from the illegal government action and to
evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original illegality, or the fruit
of the poisonous tree. Page, 140 Idaho at 846, 103 P.3d at 459; Wong Sun, 371
U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. at 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d at 455. The test is' "whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of [the original] illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."'
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 417, 9 L.Ed.2d at 455 (quoting
MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)). Under this test, evidence that
is sufficiently attenuated from the illegal government action may be admitted at
trial. Page, 140 Idaho at 846, 103 P.3d at 459; see also Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at
488, 83 S.Ct. at 417, 9 L.Ed.2d at 455. When a defendant moves to exclude
evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the government carries the burden of proving that the search or
seizure in question was reasonable. State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 486, 95
P.3d 635, 637 (2004).
The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement has been held to apply to
brief investigatory detentions. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
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1878, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 904 (1968). To determine whether such seizures are
reasonable, courts first ask 'whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception.' Id at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1878-79, 20 L.Ed.2d at 904-05. The level of
justification required depends on the intrusiveness of the seizure. Id at 20-22, 88
S.Ct. at 1879-80, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905-06. Next, they consider whether the action
'was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.' Id at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1878-79, 20 L.Ed.2d at
904-05.
Typically, seizures must be based on probable cause to be reasonable. Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324-1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 237238 (1983). However, limited investigatory detentions, based on less than
probable cause, are permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable
articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.
Id. at 409, 103 S.Ct. at 1324, 75 L.Ed. 2d at 236. Reasonable suspicion must be
based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn
from those facts. See State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223
(Ct. App. 2003); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905. The
quantity and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is
less than that necessary to establish probable cause. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.
325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 308 (1990). Still, reasonable
suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or 'inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion.' Id. at 329, 110 S.Ct. at 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d at 308 (quoting United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, IO (1989)).
Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.
Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628-29 (1981).
An informant's tip regarding suspected criminal activity may give rise to
reasonable suspicion when it would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that a stop was appropriate.' White, 496 U.S. at 329, 110 S.Ct. at 2415, 110
L.Ed.2d at 308 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at
906) (internal quotation and alteration marks omitted). Whether a tip amounts to
reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances including the
substance, source, and reliability of the information provided. See id at 328-29,
110 S.Ct. at 2415, 110 L.Ed.2d at 307-08 (noting that 'an informant's "veracity,"
"reliability," and "basis of knowledge" are highly relevant factors in determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists). In other words, a tip must possess adequate
indicia ofreliability in order to justify a Terry stop. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 617 (1972). The more reliable the
tip, the less information required to establish reasonable suspicion. White, 496
U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d at 308. Factors indicative of
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reliability include whether the informant reveals his or her identity and the basis
of his or her knowledge, whether the location of the informant is known, whether
the information was based on first-hand observations of the events as they were
occurring, whether the information the informant provided was subject to
immediate confirmation or corroboration by police, whether the informant has
previously provided reliable information, whether the informant provides
predictive information, and whether the informant could be held criminally liable
ifthe report were discovered to be false. White, 496 U.S. at 331-32, 110 S.Ct. at
2416-17, 110 L.Ed.2d at 309-10; Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47, 92 S.Ct. at 192324, 32 L.Ed.2d at 617; State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101-02, 15 P.3d 334, 336-37
(Ct. App. 2000). If a tip lacks adequate indicia of reliability, police generally
must engage in further investigation before conducting a Terry stop. Williams,
407 U.S. at 147, 92 S.Ct. at 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d at 617.

State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811-812, 203 P .3d at 1210-11 (footnote omitted).
Bishop was decided only on a federal constitutional analysis. Id., 145 Idaho at 822, 203
P.3d at 1221, ftnt. 4. However, a violation of the Fourth Amendment is also a violation ofldaho
Const. Art. I,§ 17. State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130, 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999).
When a tip is offered by a known citizen informant, independent police verification of the
tip is not generally necessary. Nonetheless, under the totality of the circumstances analysis, the
content of the tip and the informant's basis of knowledge remain relevant in determining whether
the tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P3.d at 1211,
citing State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703, 708, 169 P.3d 291, 296 (Ct. App. 2007).
While a tip based upon hearsay is not automatically precluded from establishing
reasonable suspicion, the original hearsay declarant's basis of knowledge, reliability, and veracity
are factors to be considered under the totality of the circumstances analysis. Bishop, I 46 Idaho at
813-14, 203 P.3d at 1212-13. See United States v. Monteiro, 447 F.3d 39, 45-46 (1 51 Cir. 2006)
(concluding that an informant's tip that based on information that his relative told him did not
give rise to reasonable suspicion because the infomrnnt would not identify the relative and
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"police ... had no way of knowing the [relative's] state of mind ... when she gave her
information, or whether she was a person who could be relied on to relate events accurately").
When a tip is based upon hearsay from an unknown source, it is akin to an anonymous
tip. Monteiro, 447 F.3d at 45. When a tip is anonymous and it merely provides a description of
a suspect and alleges that he or she committed a crime, the tip generally will not give rise to a
reasonable suspicion. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211. See Florida v. JL., 529 U.S.
266, 271-72, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 1378-79, 146 L.Ed.2d 254, 260-61 (2000) (concluding that a tip
that a young man was carrying a gun did not give rise to reasonable suspicion because the
anonymous informant merely alleged that the man committed a crime and provided a description
of the suspect.)
In this case, the state presented the following evidence to support the stop of Mr. Widner:
1) On January 11, 2011, the confidential informant said that he/she believed that Mr.
Widner was going to California either that weekend or the next to resupply marijuana. Tr.
10/27/11, p. 21, In. 18 - p. 22, In. 4.
The state did not offer any information as to the basis for the CI' s belief - however,
clearly, the CI was relying on hearsay - whether hearsay from Mr. Widner or from someone else
as to Mr. Widner's intentions. In fact, the Cl's "belief' could have been based on multiple levels
of hearsay. And, no information about the identity of the hearsay declarant or declarants, their
basis of knowledge, reliability, or veracity was offered.
Moreover, this tip was apparently inaccurate as the state presented no evidence that Mr.
Widner made any trip to California or even possessed any marijuana on the weekend of January
15, 2011, or the weekend of January 22, 2011.
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2) On January 21, 2011, the CI stated that he or she had not had any contact with Mr.
Widner and "believed" he was probably out of marijuana. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 22, In. 21-24. Later,
that day, the informant stated that Mr. Widner was still in town, but was going to travel to
California.
Again, the state presented no information as to the informant's basis of knowledge as to
whether Mr. Widner was in town, was out of marijuana, and was going to California. And,
again, the information offered by the informant must have been hearsay obtained either from Mr.
Widner or some other source, because no one but Mr. Widner could have anything but hearsay
knowledge ofhis intentions. There could have been multiple levels of hearsay. Yet, the state
offered no information about the identity of the hearsay declarant or declarants, their basis of
knowledge, reliability, or veracity.
3) On January 26, 2011, the informant again told the police that he or she had not spoken
to Mr. Widner for a couple of days. Later that day, the informant said that "he or she had learned
that Mr. Widner was going to be traveling to California on that weekend." Tr. 10/27/11, p. 24,
In. 1-15.
Again, the informant's information was clearly based upon hearsay, possibly multiple
levels of hearsay - someone had told the informant that Mr. Widner was going to go to California
that weekend. But, again, the state did not offer any information whatsoever about the identity of
the hearsay declarant or declarants, their basis of knowledge, reliability, or veracity.
4) On January 29, 2011, the informant told the police that he or she had not spoken to Mr.
Widner for a couple of days and that he or she believed he had left Mountain Home.
Again, the informant's information appears to be based upon hearsay because the
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informant did not claim to have seen Mr. Widner leaving town. And, again, the state did not
present any information whatsoever about the identity of the hearsay declarant or declarants, or
these individuals' basis of knowledge, reliability or veracity. Moreover, the information that Mr.
Widner had left town proved to be wrong, because a few hours later the CI contacted the police
to say that Mr. Widner was not leaving until January 30, 2011.
5) Later in the day on January 29, 2011, the CI contacted the police to say that "he or she
had learned that Mr. Widner was planning to leave in the early morning hours of January 30 to go
resupply his supply of marijuana" and would return sometime that night or the early morning
hours of the next day. Tr. 10/27111, p. 25, ln. 14-23.
Again, the Cl's information was clearly based upon hearsay. But, again, the state did not
provide any information about the identity of the hearsay declarant or declarants, those
individuals' basis of knowledge, reliability or veracity.
6) When the police attempted to verify the Cl's information, they could not. Rather, the
police determined that both of Mr. Widner' s cars were at his home. Tr. 10/27/11, p. 26, ln. 5-12.
So, the police asked the CI for more information. And, later that day, the CI said that "he or she
learned that Mr. Widner had traveled to California with a roommate, Alex Stewart, and they were
said to be in Mr. Stewart's vehicle." Tr. 10/27/11, p. 28, ln. 7-11.
Again, the Cl's information was clearly based upon hearsay, possibly multiple levels of
hearsay. And, again, the state presented no evidence of the hearsay declarant or declarant's
identity, basis of knowledge, reliability, or veracity.
Assessing the totality of the circumstances, the state did not have a reasonable articulable
suspicion to support a Terry stop.
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Consider first the CI him or herself. While the CI was known to the police, his or her
basis of knowledge, reliability and veracity remain relevant to an assessment of whether the Cl's
tip was sufficient to provide a basis for a Terry stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P3.d at 1211.
The Cl's basis of knowledge varied. While the CI had made two controlled buys in the
past and could offer first hand information about those buys, those buys were in the past and their
relevance to the current tip was limited. The first occurred three and a half months prior to the
stop and the most recent occurred nearly seven weeks prior to the stop. While there is no
magical number of days within which information is fresh and after which it is stale, and while
the case law states that in narcotics trafficking cases a time delay in a sequence of events is of
less significance, State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 24-25, 56 P.3d 780, 786-87 (Ct. App. 2002),
three and a half months since the first buy and seven weeks since the second buy is a significant
amount of time.
But, most importantly, while the CI may have had a good basis of knowledge and may
have been (the evidence presented by the state was insufficient to establish this) reliable and
honest in the controlled buy situations where he or she was reporting first hand knowledge, by
the time the police decided to pull over the Honda on the highway in the middle of the night, the
CI no longer was giving the police information based upon his or her own observations. Rather,
the CI was reporting hearsay from an unknown source or sources. The basis of knowledge no
longer supported a finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion.
With regard to reliability, the CI may have had a history of reliable information related to
the controlled buys (the state did not provide sufficient evidence about these buys to establish
how reliable the information was - but apparently, the information was not such that the state was
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willing to file an information and prosecute for delivery), but the Cl's reliability was bad by the
time the police decided to rely on his/her tip to stop the Honda. The CI repeatedly told the police
that Mr. Widner was going to depart or had departed for California when he had not. Even if the
CI had been reliable in the past (which Mr. Widner does not concede), the CI was no longer
reliable by the time the police decided to act on his/her tip to stop the Honda.
With regard to veracity, the Cl's motivations should be considered. The CI was "working
off' delivery charges and to save him/herself criminal prosecution and the CI had "targeted" Mr.
Widner. Tr.10/27111,p.17,ln.21-p.18,ln.15. AsdiscussedbyProfessorNatapoff,
informants working off charges are notoriously lacking in reliability and veracity.
A. Beyond Unreliable
Judicial as well as much scholarly discomfort with informants traditionally has
flowed from their infamous unreliability as witnesses. Courts have held that
without procedural protections against unreliability, using criminals who testify in
exchange for benefits may raise due process and other fairness issues for
defendants against whom informant testimony is levied. Commentators have
documented numerous horror stories of fabrication and perjury by informants.
Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 645, 663 (2004). See also, Michael Rich, Coerced Informants and Thirteenth Amendment
Limitations on the Police-Informant Relationship, 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 681 (2010), discussing
the enormous pressures, amounting to involuntary servitude, on informants who must choose
between providing information and facing their own criminal prosecutions. Such relationships
are obviously conducive to the reporting of manufactured false information.
Consider next the identity, basis of knowledge, reliability, and veracity of the hearsay
declarant or declarants whose statements regarding Mr. Widner's intents and travels were
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reported to the police by the confidential informant. Nothing is known about the identity or the
basis of knowledge. And, the reliability and veracity are known to be bad - repeatedly incorrect
information was passed regarding when the supposed trip would be made.
Applying a totality of the circumstances test, the information known to the police was not
sufficient to establish a reasonable and articulable suspicion to allow the Terry stop of the Honda
and its occupants. Bishop, supra; Monteiro, supra. (Even the police apparently recognized this
because Officer Malenese was instructed to develop his own independent probable cause to stop
the Honda. Tr. 10/27111, p. 71, ln. 17-22.) Therefore, this Court should reverse the order
denying the motion in limine and remand with instructions to allow Mr. Widner to withdraw his
guilty plea.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Widner requests that the order denying the motion in
limine be reversed and that the case be remanded so that he can withdraw his guilty plea.
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Respectfully submitted this __ day of April, 2013.

Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Daniel Widne
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